Theorising The Relationship Between Justice And Law

Devank Agarwalla, The Doon School, Dehradun, India

INTRODUCTION

In this essay, I argue that justice is a part of law, meaning it is an essential part of the formation and implementation of law, not a moral judgement, which might simply comment about the ‘justness’ of a law after it has been enforced.

At the outset, I could start by defining the terms ‘law’ and ‘justice;’ however, this is an arduous task, as there are many perspectives about the law; for instance, legal positivism stands in stark contrast to the natural theory of law (Green et al, 2003). If I define these ‘law’ and ‘justice’ in my own terms and consider my statements to be axiomatic, then I would have proved that there is a certain relationship between two concepts of my own invention. Moreover, you may not agree with my definitions, rendering my whole analysis futile.

Therefore, I embrace Hegel’s philosophy of language, stating that concepts such as law and justice do not exist in the concrete realm, and individuals will not encounter this in reality. Rather, they would witness the clash of these concepts, like whether judges should decide cases on the basis of law or justice; we can infer that entities do not exist solely but we consider the relationship between entities (D’Amato, 2011). To defend my position, I will follow the Hegelian dialectic, which asserts that a ‘thesis’ or a proposition would inevitably have its polar opposite known as the ‘antithesis.’ This creates a blockade, stifling progress; however, reconciling the ‘thesis’ and ‘antithesis’ would yield a ‘synthesis,’ something that I will try to achieve (Sproul, 2021). Thus, I will present the case against justice (my thesis), refute the arguments made (my antithesis) and finally synthesise.