The Conundrum Of Artistic Quality Under The Law Of Copyright: A Comparative Study Between India, UK And France
Baishali Jain, Lovely Professional University, Punjab
Introduction
“It’s the emotion, it’s the mood that a thing or incident brings upon you, that you’re going to paint. It’s not the thing itself. If I’m painting a lamp, I’m painting what it means to me.”
The above lines by Alexander explaining Art in an interview with the Orange Country Register in 2003 very clearly depicts the nature of art and can back-up the topic to be discussed in this article.
Art is one of the most novel creations of human mind. It is one such work which has as many interpretations as many viewers. The value of such work changes from individual to individual depending upon the person, the age and the place. A masterpiece painting showing the present COVID-19 pandemic condition might be high on aesthetic/artistic value for today’s audience, but would not be the same for the audience of later century. The viewers of today’s generation will have a totally different perception/interpretation because of their experience when compared to the ones who will just read/ hear about such pandemic in future.
Copyright law establishes framework to protect artistic creation by providing a system of economic incentives. By granting an artist property rights in her work, the Copyright Act fosters the production of a wide array of creative works from many different genres. To this end, the Copyright statute does not define art; rather it draws line and sets forth flexible categories of works which are eligible for protection. There are no qualitative tests, simply a low threshold of originality and a requirement that the work be an expression, not an idea.
‘Artistic quality’ judgments are “dangerous undertakings” for courts. In theory, copyright doesn’t distinguish between works on the basis of aesthetic values or merit, and courts often go to great lengths to try to avoid artistic judgments. In practice, however, implicit aesthetic criteria are deeply embedded throughout copyright case law.
While courts have little difficulty navigating through dense thickets of economics, psychology, science, they become utterly flummoxed when confronted with ‘work of art’.[1] This is a curious phenomenon because judges are broadly conversant in art, and artistic interpretation is quite similar to the textual exegesis that is inherent to judicial practice. Judges abstain from making aesthetic judgments on the basis that they are incompetent to do so and that any artistic definition or interpretation that might offer would be subject to the whims of personal taste. Art, it seems, is like obscenity: it is something courts know when they see, but can’t speak about intelligibly.[2]
This article examines the position of ‘Artistic work’ under Copyright Law of India, U.K and France. It also aims to clear the grey area regarding the “Artistic quality standard” to be fulfilled when seeking Copyright protection with the laid down provisions in the respective statute and the settled case laws.
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