Janak Sejpal, SVKM's Pravin Gandhi College of Law
ABSTRACT
Judicial independence and accountability are necessary twin pillars of constitutional democracies. The judiciary in India has been bestowed with vast autonomy to afford insulation of the institution vis-a-vis other organs of the state for the protection of the rule of law and rights of the citizenry. However, independence without accountability promotes inefficiency, opacity, and arbitrariness on the contrary. Excessive accountability inhibits judicial impartiality and gutsiness. As an intermediate institution, the development of the judiciary in India—especially the collegium system- come with strengths and weaknesses in the judicial architecture. While our Constitution makers while drafting the Constitution have borrowed from multiple jurisdictions and later tailored it according to Indian needs and experiences, we can once again attempt to follow the same practice so as to repair the cracks which are harming our institutions ever since. Taking cues from Indian experience and international comparisons from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, this paper offers proposals like transparent appointments, structured oversight of misconduct, and a strengthened internal ethics framework for the balance of independence and accountability. Only through rebalancing will India be able to succeed in having judicial integrity without sacrificing judicial freedom. In our endeavour to achieve so, we must shed our prejudices and look outwards for inspiration. This paper is a reflection of the same.
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