Abhijeet Mishra, Amity Law School, Noida
ABSTRACT
Article 356 of the Constitution of India, which deals with presidential discretionary powers of emergency, has long been the favoured topic of political debate - and, at times, the cause of much ire within the legal intellectual community in India. Although the constitution of India envisages a federal form of government, its evolution in practice over the years, along with several of its provisions, threatens its definition and disrupts its functioning. This paper in particular deals with the position of the Governor and with Emergency Powers. It also deals with the wide powers given to the central government to assert its authority over a state if civil unrest occurs, and the state government does not have the means to end it. It also talks of the landmark judgements which lead to various changes in the Article to ensure safety from misuse of the Article by the authorities and also underlines the guidelines and observations mentioned in the Sarkaria Commission Report, 1987. The general concept which is established in this paper is that while the founding fathers of the Indian constitution argued for a strong federal government, they would probably be surprised and baffled by the arbitrary and capricious way some of the powers have been used by the federal government over the states, particularly those belonging to the opposition.
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